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Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated
Government and Detrimental Reliance: Transforming
Lightning into a Lightning Bug
[T]he difference between the almost right word and the
right word is really a large matter-'tis the difference
between the lightning-bug and the lightning. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Darrell Suire's home was cracked. Specifically, the "front
door, the floor, the foundation, the ceiling, and the walls" were
cracked.2 The mortar on his patio was crumbling, and the roof was
leaking.3 Suire had problems, and the City of Lafayette and its
general contractor seemed to have caused those problems.4 Suire
wanted those responsible to repair the damage.
Representatives of the city and its general contractor had come
to Suire before they even began work and told him that they had a
servitude to enter his land; 5 they assured him that they would pay
for any damage to his property.6  After workers pounded steel
sheeting into the ground with a backhoe, Suire began noticing the
above problems with his house. 7 He contacted the city and its
general contractor in an attempt to obtain compensation for the
damage. 8 When they failed to pay, Suire sued the city, its general
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Mark Twain, TALES, SPEECHES, ESSAYS, AND SKETCHES 360 (Tom
Quirk ed., 1994).
2. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 43 (La.
2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 42.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 43.
8. Original Opposition Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Darrell J. Suire to
Original Briefs Submitted by Defendant-Appellants, Lafayette City-Parish
Consolidated Government, Bob Bros. Construction Co. L.L.C. and/or Bob Bros.
Construction Co., and National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, and National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Louisiana at 2, Suire v.
Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37 (La. 2005) (No. 04-C-1459)
[hereinafter Brief of Suire to All Defendants].
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contractor, and the engineering firm that supplied the plans, though
the latter Party was later released through unopposed summary
judgment. His theories of recovery included negligence and strict
liability, absolute liability, trespass, res ipsa loquitur, breach of
contract, expropriation, and detrimental reliance.' 0 The parties
fought a battle of motions for summary judgment over, among
other things, whether each theory of recovery could proceed to
trial." The trial court dismissed all but the negligence and trespass
claims, and the parties appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal. The third circuit, in an unpublished opinion,
reversed as to the claims of absolute liability, breach of contract,
expropriation, and detrimental reliance, holding that the
determination of all four claims should be deferred to the merits.'
3
In Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government,14 the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered which of these four claims, if
any, should proceed to trial on the merits.
The supreme court, reversing the third circuit, dismissed both
the absolute liability and breach of contract claims,' 5 and affirmed
the third circuit's decision to allow the expropriation claim to
proceed to trial. 16 Significantly, the court also affirmed the third
circuit's decision to permit the detrimental reliance claim to
proceed to trial. 1i The court found that Suire had at least alleged
the three elements of a detrimental reliance claim under Louisiana
law: "(1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable
reliance; and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of
9. Suire, 907 So. 2d at 54-57. The supreme court held that the relatively
small payment made by the engineering firm to Suire contingent upon the
court's granting its unopposed motion for summary judgment did not constitute
a settlement agreement. Id.
10. Id. at 43.
11. Id. at 43-44.
12. Id. at 44-45.
13. Id. at 45-47.
14. See generally id.
15. The court found, as a matter of law, that the installation of metal
sheeting was not "pile driving" for purposes of Louisiana Civil Code article 667.
Id. at 48. It found that Suire "failed, as a matter of law, to establish the
existence of an oral contract under article 1846." Id. at 58.
16. Id. at 61.
17. Id. at 59-60.
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the reliance" (the "judicial test").' 8 After quickly disposing of the
city's objections,' 9 the court concluded that Suire had alleged the
elements necessary to proceed under the theory of detrimental
reliance.20 It supplied little rationale for this part of its decision,
and the deficiency exposes problems with Louisiana's current
treatment of detrimental reliance claims.
The facts in this case superficially appear to satisfy the above
three-part judicial test; however, the test itself is flawed. The
difference between the current test and an appropriate test is as
small and as great as the difference between "the lightning" and
"the lightning-bug." This note explores the proper place of
detrimental reliance in Louisiana law, explains that Suire was
incorrectly decided with respect to the detrimental reliance claim,
and proposes a more suitable judicial test for detrimental reliance
claims. Part II briefly explores the origins of detrimental reliance
at common law and its adoption into Louisiana law. It proposes
that the judicial test should not permit recovery under a detrimental
reliance theory where the pleaded facts support an appropriate
alternative theory of recovery. Part III explores tort law and
property law as two alternative theories of recovery available in
Suire. Because this exploration reveals a flaw in the way the court
applies the current judicial test, Part III argues that the test should
not permit recovery where the detriment was inevitable. Part IV
sets out the proposed modified judicial test and applies the facts of
Suire for demonstration. Part V highlights some problems with the
18. Id. at 59 (citing Lakeland Anesthesia, Inc. v. United Healthcare of La.,
Inc., 871 So. 2d 380, 393 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 876 So. 2d 834 (La.
2004)). This note refers to this three-part test as Louisiana's judicial test
because the three elements-while used by Louisiana courts-are not taken
explicitly from the language of article 1967. See source cited infra note 42 and
accompanying text.
19. The city's objections were that there was no contract between the parties
and that Suire could not show actual reliance on the promise. Suire, 907 So. 2d
at 59. The court correctly states that detrimental reliance requires no contract.
Id. It glosses over the issue of whether there was actual reliance, stating simply:
"[T]o establish reliance to his detriment, Suire need only show that he suffered
damages not adequately compensated by the defendant." Id. The purpose of
this note is, in part, to explain the flaws in that statement and to suggest a better
test.
20. Id.
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supreme court's decision particular to Suire; and, more
importantly, it argues that Suire is an inappropriate expansion of
the theory of detrimental reliance. Part V then explains the
problems with expanding a legal theory and hypothesizes some
additional problems with this expansion. Finally, Part VI
concludes by advocating that Louisiana courts adopt a more
appropriate judicial test for detrimental reliance to properly handle
detrimental reliance claims.
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
Though one member of the Louisiana State Law Institute
involved in the 1984 revision to Louisiana Civil Code article 1967
asserts that the concept of detrimental reliance stemmed from the
Roman law concept venire contra proprium factum ("no one can
contradict his own act"), 2 1 drafts of the revision to article 1967
explicitly cite the common law as inspiration, particularly
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (hereinafter Section 90).22
Arguably, the concept of venire contra propiumfactum underlay
some Code articles before the 1984 revision. However, a
Louisiana court in 1981 could not find a single instance of a
Louisiana court adopting that concept, 24 and in the few years
21. Shael Herman, Detrimental Reliance in Louisiana Law-Past, Present,
and Future (?): The Code Drafter's Perspective, 58 TUL. L. REv. 707, 714
(1984). Evidently only one Louisiana case was explicitly based on the doctrine,
and it offered little by way of explanation: "We conclude, on the civil law
estoppel doctrine of venire contra factum proprium non valet that our lessor
cannot be allowed to evict our lessee for failing to actually spend the withheld
rent on repairs when it was the lessor herself who importuned the lessee to delay
those repairs." Davilla v. Jones, 418 So. 2d 724, 725 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 436 So. 2d 507 (La. 1983) (citation omitted). Notably, the supreme court
did not mention the doctrine of venire contra in its reversing opinion. See id.
22. David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel, the
Civil Law, and the Mixed Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 695, 708
(1998). The article is an excellent and thoughtful examination of Louisiana's
1984 revision to article 1967 and explains in-depth the tension between the civil
law and common law, which may only be suggested here. See generally id.
23. Id.
24. Sanders v. United Distributors, Inc., 405 So. 2d 536, 537 n.2 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1130 (La. 1982).
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preceding the revision, the maxim arose infrequently. 25  An
alternative civilian-rooted concept, the German maxim culpa in
contrahendo ("fault in contracting"), had similarly scant support in
Louisiana jurisprudence; 26 consequently, it too is unworthy of
discussion here. Because the common law concept of detrimental
reliance is the primary source of the revision, it is the focus of this
exploration.
A. Detrimental Reliance at Common Law
At common law, legal scholars essentially equate detrimental
reliance with the concept of promissory estoppel, which prevents a
party from reneging on a promise he has made.27 The doctrine of
detrimental reliance is an equitable remedy for the problem of what
25. See Jon C. Adcock, The 1984 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code's
Articles on Obligations-A Student Symposium: Detrimental Reliance, 45 LA. L.
REv. 753, 755-56 (1985); Snyder, supra note 22, at 705-06 ("Even fewer cases
mentioned venire contrafactum proprium, and only one or two courts had based
a decision on the idea.").
26. Adcock, supra note 25, at 756; Herman, supra note 21, at 743-45;
Snyder, supra note 22, at 705 ("Before [revised] article 1967 went into effect,
the cases mentioning culpa in contrahendo could be counted on one hand, and
no court had based a decision on the doctrine."). See also Coleman v. Bossier
City, 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974). The court explained culpa in contrahendo as
"a fault in contracting which gives rise to a quasi-contractual obligation" to pay
the other party's reliance damages. Id. at 447. Thus, the doctrine appears to be
tied closely to contract law.
27. Christian Larroumet, Eason- Weinmann Center for Comparative Law
Symposium on Reflections on the Civil-Law Tradition in Louisiana: Agenda for
the Twenty-First Century: Detrimental Reliance and Promissory Estoppel As the
Cause of Contracts in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1209,
1220-21 (1986); Snyder, supra note 22, at 698 (noting the lack of significant
distinction between the terms "detrimental reliance" and "promissory estoppel").
Promissory estoppel (detrimental reliance) is itself similar to the concept of
equitable estoppel, which allows the court to prevent a party from denying the
truth of his own factual assertion. Id. at 701-02. See also Michael B. Metzer &
Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44
Sw. L.J. 841, 846-47 (1990). Though both have the same goal-preventing a
party from going back on his or her word-they are distinguishable in that
equitable estoppel refers to a past or present fact (which is either true or false),
whereas promissory estoppel relates to a future, uncertain promise. Snyder,
supra note 22, at 701-02. This note is appropriately restricted in scope to
promissory estoppel.
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to do when one party is injured by relying on the other party's
broken promise and the injured party may otherwise obtain no
legal relief.28 Promissory estoppel developed slowly at common
law, primarily in cases outside the commercial arena.29 By the
time the American Law Institute crafted the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, courts had sufficiently acknowledged the doctrine to
warrant a clear summary of it.30 The result was Section 90, which
provides in relevant part:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted
for breach may be limited as justice requires.3 1
Common law courts have, in turn, adopted different judicial
tests for detrimental reliance, but all essentially track the language
of Section 90.32
While the doctrine was initially limited to donative gratuitous
promises and those with only peripheral business and economic
motives, 33 courts eventually broadened the concept to include
promises made in a commercial setting that were unsupported by
consideration. 34 As a result, the doctrine became "applicable to
28. See, e.g., Larroumet, supra note 27, at 1223 ("Detrimental reliance...
is not an element of the law of contract as is consideration .... To consider the
promise enforceable on the ground of detrimental reliance does not mean that
the promise has led to a contract .... This substitute for consideration leads to
another ground of recovery that is not purely contractual.").
29. See generally Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, 4 A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8:6 (4th ed. 1992 & Supp. 2006).
30. Metzer & Phillips, supra note 27, at 848.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
32. See generally C.C. Marvel, Comment, Detrimental Reliance, 48
A.L.R.2d 1069 (2005), for a sample of cases using various judicial tests.
33. Williston & Lord, supra note 29, at 119. An example of a donative
gratuitous promise is a promise to give a gift or a promise to donate money to a
charity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. f (1981). An
example of a promise with only peripheral business or economic motives is a
gratuitous bailment. Williston & Lord, supra note 29, at § 8:6.
34. Metzer & Phillips, supra note 27, at 849-51. One of the most famous
cases in this area-and a good example of a typical commercial promise lacking
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any relied-upon promise, whether donative or commercial, fully
thought out or preliminary." 35 Though a plaintiff may still rely on
an underlying promise that is indefinite, 6 courts usually do not
permit recovery under the theory of detrimental reliance when the
underlying promise is illusory.
37
The traditional view was that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel/detrimental reliance originated essentially as a gap-filler
in contract law-a judicial tool that would allow a promisee to
recover when consideration was absent but justice required
enforcement of a promise. 38 The doctrine has more recently been
characterized as existing somewhere between contract and tort,
though its exact nature is still unclear.3 9 Promissory estoppel was
consideration-is Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958), in
which the court enforced a subcontractor's bid to a general contractor by: (1)
implying a promise by the subcontractor not to revoke the bid; and then (2)
applying the concept of detrimental reliance. Id. at 759-60.
35. Williston & Lord, supra note 29, at 153.
36. See Metzer & Phillips, supra note 27, at 853-56. "Under traditional
contract principles, a promise may be too indefinite for enforcement if it is too
vague or too incomplete." Id. at 853 n.83.
37. Id. at 856-63. "An illusory promise is one that in reality imposes no
obligation on the promisor." Id. at 856 n.109.
38. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence
of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1223, 1240-41 (1984) (reviewing E.
Allen Farnsworth, CONTRACTS (1982)). The author stated:
The attempt to remedy the problems of the bargain theory with gap
fillers like section 90 of the Restatement could reasonably be credited
with having saved contract law (and freedom of contract) from the
death that some had wished it, but it has not proved entirely satisfactory
.... The bargain theory of consideration, reflecting the principle of
contractual freedom, is thereby placed on a collision course with
section-90-type responses, which are based on a principle of reliance
that imposes liability despite the absence of manifestations of intent to
be legally bound. The exception constantly threatens to swallow the
rule.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
39. See Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 73, 78-81, 97-98
(Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). Because issues like detrimental reliance
appear to be blurring the line between contracts and torts, Professor Gilmore
humorously suggests that first-year law students should be taught a single course
called Contorts. Id. at 98.
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traditionally viewed essentially as a theory of last resort, though
some courts now view it as a primary basis for recovery.
40
B. Detrimental Reliance in Louisiana Law
In 1984, the Louisiana State Law Institute took this primarily
common law concept with all its attendant uncertainties and
attempted to dress it in civilian clothes.4' The 1984 revision
introduced detrimental reliance through Louisiana Civil Code
article 1967. After defining cause as "the reason why a party
obligates himself," the article continues:
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or
should have known that the promise would induce the other
party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was
reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the
expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the
promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not
reasonable.42
The similarities between article 1967 and Section 90 are
readily apparent. Both speak of a promise, an inducement based
on the promise, a reasonableness requirement, and a potential
limitation of damages. This similarity is only natural since Section
90 is the inspiration for article 1967.43 Thus, it comes as no
surprise that the judicial test for detrimental reliance claims used
by Louisiana courts echoes those used in common law
40. See Phuong N. Pham, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL
L. REv. 1263 (1994). The author stated:
[C]ourts and commentators have declared that promissory estoppel is
no longer a theory of last resort, but rather a primary basis for recovery.
Adherents of this view claim that courts apply promissory estoppel
instead of bargain theory "even where there has been a bargained-for
reliance" or "even when no apparent barrier exists to recovery on a
traditional contract theory."
Id. at 1267-68 (footnotes omitted).
41. Snyder, supra note 22, at 695-96.
42. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (2006). The effective date of the revision
is January 1, 1985. Id.
43. See source cited supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions.44 The test employed by Louisiana courts requires:
"(1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance;
and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of the
reliance. 4 5 This simple test encapsulates the black-letter meaning
of article 1967, yet it omits crucial questions from the test and
consequently leaves room for error.
C. An Appropriate Alternative Remedy: An Addition to the
Judicial Test
Compared to ordinary contract and tort law, the doctrine of
detrimental reliance remains relatively unsettled and confusing.
46
Furthermore, the amount recoverable under detrimental reliance
may be limited to actual expenses or damages.47 Thus, where-as
in Suire-a plaintiff has already limited the demand to damages,
48
the amount of recovery will be the same regardless of the theory
used. Because double recovery for the same claim is disallowed,
the addition of a detrimental reliance claim should not increase the
plaintiff's award.49 The plaintiff will still have to present sufficient
proof of the detrimental reliance claim. 50 Thus, where other
44. See source cited supra note 32 and accompanying text.
45. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 59 (La.
2005) (citing Lakeland Anesthesia, Inc. v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., 871
So. 2d 380, 393 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 876 So. 2d 834 (La. 2004)).
46. Leon Rittenberg III, Comment, Louisiana's Tenfold Approach to the
Duty to Inform, 66 TUL. L. REv. 151, 190-98 (1991). Louisiana evidently
retains elements of both a pre-revision tort-based detrimental reliance theory as
well as the post-revision theory based more in contract, but the distinctions and
practical effects are largely unclear. Id. See discussion supra Part II.A and infra
Part V.
47. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (2006) ("Recovery may be limited to
the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisee's
reliance on the promise."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981)
("The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.").
48. Suire, 907 So. 2d at 43.
49. Of course, if the theory of detrimental reliance would somehow allow
broader recovery than alternative theories of recovery, then those theories are
not "appropriate" with respect to compensating the plaintiff. Thus, even under
the modified judicial test, the plaintiff may proceed under a detrimental reliance
theory in the appropriate case. See discussion infra Part IV.
50. See sources cited infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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theories of recovery are appropriate (if an alternative theory has the
potential only for lesser recovery, it should not be considered
appropriate), adding a detrimental reliance claim adds complexity
without increasing the plaintiffs potential recovery.5 Detrimental
reliance by nature has traditionally been a residual category upon
which to rely when other theories are inapplicable.5 2 Louisiana's
current three-part judicial test ignores these considerations, but a
proper judicial test should adequately account for alternative
appropriate theories of recovery.
III. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF RECOVERY IN SUIRE
To say that recovery should not be permitted under the theory
of detrimental reliance where there is a more appropriate theory of
recovery is not to say that a plaintiffs suit should be dismissed on
technical grounds. In Louisiana "[e]very pleading shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice., 53 "[A] final judgment shall
51. See sources cited supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Frost Crushed Stone Co. v. Odell Geer Constr. Co., 110
S.W.3d 41, 51 (Tex. App. 2002) (Gray, J., dissenting). Judge Gray stated:
Promissory estoppel has a place as an equitable remedy when some
other cause of action fails and equity demands protection of one of the
parties. But equity should only be the last resort when legal remedies
fail for some reason. I believe, based on the research conducted, that
this case presents a very unique opportunity to distinguish between the
proper role of promissory estoppel as a limited remedy rather than as a
free standing cause of action. In this instance, [plaintiff] dismissed all
its claims for legal remedies and pursued only promissory estoppel.
The relief the majority has delivered to [plaintiff] is exactly the same
[plaintiff] would have recovered if it had proven a breach of contract.
But [plaintiff] dismissed that claim. Why should it be allowed the same
relief under an equitable remedy that it chose not to seek as a legal
remedy?
Id. The dissent in Frost Crushed Stone Co. attempted and failed to prevent the
doctrine of promissory estoppel from overtaking other theories of recovery. Id.
For a discussion of how Suire may allow the detrimental reliance theory to do
the same, see infra Part V.
53. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 865 (2006). The Louisiana Supreme
Court stated:
We have repudiated the theory-of-the-case pleading of the common law
.... It is well established that a pleading must be reasonably construed
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grant ... relief... even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and
equitable relief.",54 Thus, Louisiana courts may permit the case to
proceed under a theory of recovery that the plaintiff has not
pleaded, provided that the pleaded facts support the theory.
55
Where the plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to support an
appropriate alternative theory of recovery, the court should decide
the case under the alternative theory. 56 Suire appears to have at
least two alternative theories of recovery, each of which is
supported by the pleaded facts. This note assumes, arguendo, that
Suire can prove that the actions of the city and general contractor
caused the damage to his home, which will avoid irrelevant issues
that are properly reserved to the trial court.
57
so as to afford the litigant his day in court, arrive at the truth, and do
substantial justice. Hence, we look to the substance of the demand.
Royal Furniture Co. v. Benton, 256 So. 2d 614, 616 (La. 1972) (citation
omitted).
54. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 862 (2006). This article is subject to the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1703, which provides that "[a]
judgment by default shall not be different in kind from that demanded in the
petition. The amount of damages awarded shall be the amount proven to be
properly due as a remedy." Id. See also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1703
(2006). Thus, outside of a default judgment, the court has the full discretion
granted by article 862.
55. Rittenberg, supra note 46, at 183-84. See, e.g., Coats v. AT&T, 681 So.
2d 1243 (La. 1996). In Coats, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover under
the theory of occupational disease-even though the plaintiff failed to plead or
brief the issue-because the pleaded facts sufficiently supported the theory. Id.
at 1246. For a similar rule for the similar theory of equitable estoppel, see
Thebner v. Xerox Corp., 480 So. 2d 454, 458 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), writ
denied, 484 So. 2d 139 (La. 1986) ("[Equitable] [e]stoppel, as an element of a
cause of action, is not, as a rule, available, unless specifically pleaded. The
exceptions to the rule are found in cases where the facts relied upon are set out
in the petition, or the plaintiff has had no opportunity to offer the plea.").
56. Thus, courts may ensure that justice is done while avoiding a potentially
confusing area of the law. This is in line with the concept of judicial restraint,
one definition of which is "the principle that, when a court can resolve a case
based on a particular issue, it should do so, without reaching unnecessary
issues." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
57. A plaintiff must prove that the actions of the defendant actually caused
the harm under any theory, even detrimental reliance. See discussion infra Part
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A. Recovery Under Tort
Under Louisiana's broad tort law expressed in article 2315,
"[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."58  Suire
appears to be a classic tort situation, with the plaintiff's property
damaged by the alleged tortfeasor. 59 Significantly, Suire did bring
a claim under negligence and will proceed to trial under that
theory.60 Suire may establish fault (as required by article 2315)
under article 667 of the Civil Code. 6 1 Clearly, tort law provides an
appropriate alternative theory in this case. In permitting it to
proceed under a detrimental reliance theory as well, the supreme
court addressed an issue it need not have addressed, disturbing an
III.C. The issue of cause-in-fact is generally a question of fact to be decided at
trial. See, e.g., Syrie v. Schilhab, 693 So. 2d 1173, 1180 (La. 1997). The issue
of proof is important because if one theory of recovery requires more proof than
another, the more burdensome theory will obviously be less desirable to a
plaintiff, all else being equal. Significantly, "[a] condition precedent to proving
a claim for detrimental reliance is demonstrating the existence of a promise upon
which the injured party could reasonably rely." Oliver v. Cent. Bank, 658 So.
2d 1316, 1323 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 660 So. 2d 477 (La. 1995).
Proving the existence of the promise may be difficult or impossible in the
absence of writing, so it may be more difficult to prove detrimental reliance
claims than other claims.
58. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2006).
59. See discussion supra Part I.
60. Id.
61. Article 667 provides in relevant part:
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still
he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the
liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage
to him. However, if the work he makes on his estate deprives his
neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable for
damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that his works would cause
damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (2006). The provisions on res ipsa loquitur and
absolute liability are omitted, since they were not permitted in this case. See
discussion supra Part I. Thus, Suire must still essentially prove that the
defendant was negligent under article 667's "reasonable care" language.
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already confusing area of the law.62 Because Suire pleaded facts
sufficient to proceed under general tort law, use of the detrimental
reliance theory should not be permitted.
B. Recovery Under the Servitude
In addition to the tort theory of recovery, Suire also pleaded
facts sufficient to support a claim for recovery under Louisiana
property law. As the supreme court notes in its decision, Suire
"was informed that a servitude had been established to permit
access to his property for purposes of the project. ' '63 The servitude
was evidently a legal public servitude, 64i.e., a predial servitude
"imposed for the public or common utility ... for the making and
repairing of. . .other public or common works.' '65 Under this
servitude, the state, as owner of the dominant estate, had "the right
to enter with his workmen and equipment into the part of the
servient estate that [was] needed for the construction or repair of
works required for the use and preservation of the servitude." 66 As
the owner of the servient estate, Suire "[was] not required to do
anything. His obligation [was] to abstain from doing something on
his estate or to permit something to be done on it ... ,,67 Thus,
where the city had a servitude to enter the land, Suire was required
by law to allow entry onto the land.
62. See discussion infra Part V.
63. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 43 (La.
2005).
64. See Original Opposition Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Darrell J. Suire to
Original Brief Submitted by Defendant-Appellants, Lafayette City-Parish
Consol. Gov't at 7, Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government, 907 So.
2d 37 (La. 2005) (No. 04-C-1466). While discussing the expropriation claim,
the brief states that "[e]ven though the public entity, such as a drainage board or
office of public works, may have a legal servitude, the entity is not authorized to
damage private property of adjacent landowners without just compensation." Id.
The record contains no other description of the servitude, and since the purpose
of the servitude as a drainage improvement project appears to fit the Civil Code
definition of a legal public servitude, this appears to be a proper
characterization. See source cited infra note 65.
65. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 665 (2006).
66. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 745 (2006).
67. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 651 (2006).
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However, simply because the city had a servitude does not
mean that the damage it caused must go uncompensated:
It is well settled in Louisiana that, under the applicable
Civil Code provisions, one holding a servitude on another's
land is bound to use that servitude in such a manner as to
not unreasonably injure the rights of the owner of the
servient estate. Thus, if the owner of the servitude uses it
in a negligent, unauthorized or unreasonable manner, the
owner of the servient estate may sue for damages. 6
8
Suire should have been able to proceed under a property theory
because he pleaded facts alleging that the owner of the dominant
estate damaged his servient estate. The court should not have
permitted the suit to proceed under a detrimental reliance theory
since doing so needlessly increased the risk of making a
detrimental change in the law. 69 Suire pleaded facts sufficient to
proceed under property law; thus, use of the detrimental reliance
theory should not be permitted.
C. It Was Meant to Be: Another Addition to the Judicial Test
The existence of a legal servitude imposed upon Suire a duty to
permit the defendant to enter his land, and the defendant had a
corresponding right to enter the land.70 Thus, regardless of what
the parties believed, the end result-the entry onto the land and the
resulting damage-was inevitable. 71  This inevitability should
logically preclude recovery under detrimental reliance.72
68. Stephens v. Int'l Paper Co., 542 So. 2d 35, 39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989)
(citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 743, 745; Duet v. La. Power & Light Co., 169
F. Supp. 184 (E.D. La. 1958); Bd. of Comm'rs of Port of New Orleans v. I11.
Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 379 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 380 So. 2d
1210 (La. 1980)).
69. The risk comes to fruition in Suire since the court's decision to allow
Suire to proceed under a detrimental reliance theory represents an overextension
of the doctrine. See discussion infra Part V.
70. See discussion supra Part III.B.
71. See generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, in 4 LA. Civ. L.
TREATISE 505, 507 n.12 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005). If Suire refused to allow
the city entry, the city could likely win an injunction under Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 3663 by only showing a disturbance of its right to enjoy
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The final element in the current judicial test is "a change in
position to one's detriment because of the reliance." 73 The phrase
"because of the reliance" strongly suggests that the reliance must
have caused the detriment. In Suire, the supreme court cited the
current test but went on to explain: "[T]he focus of analysis of a
detrimental reliance claim is . . . whether a representation was
made in such a manner that the promisor should have expected the
promisee to rely upon it, and whether the promisee so relies to his
detriment., 74 That explanation contains only a hint of causation,
and the court's own treatment of the issue is limited to the
statement, "to establish reliance to his detriment, Suire need only
show that he suffered damages not adequately compensated by the
defendant., 75  Suire's "damages not compensated by the
defendant,, 76 however, were merely the basis for any theory of
recovery and should not have automatically validated the pursuit of
a detrimental reliance claim.77 Furthermore, such a skeletal
treatment of the issue glosses over the current test's requirement
the servitude. Id. On the other hand, Suire would have to bring an article 3601
injunction, which would require a showing of "irreparable injury, loss, or
damage," but since Suire's damage can be fully compensated with money, he
should not be able to get such an injunction. Id. at 506 n.3. Thus, Suire could
not have prevented the entry, and the end result-the damage-was inevitable.
72. At least one Louisiana court has taken inevitability into account. See
Turner v. Dr. X, 878 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004). In Turner, the
intervenor was a disbarred attorney who had a legal duty to pay restitution. Id.
at 697-98, 700. She attempted to bring a detrimental reliance claim because the
defendant had not fulfilled an alleged promise to pay her funds that she, in turn,
intended to use to pay the restitution. Id. at 700. The court held that detrimental
reliance was an inappropriate theory of recovery because "[s]he was required to
pay restitution as a result of her criminal conviction, and she would have had to
pay restitution regardless of receiving money [from the defendant]." Id. The
court emphasized that the intervenor "cannot show that she 'changed her
position to her detriment' based on any reliance." Id.
73. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 59 (La.
2005) (citing Lakeland Anesthesia, Inc. v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., 871
So. 2d 380, 393 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 876 So. 2d 834 (La. 2004)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See discussion supra Parts II, III.A-B.
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that the reliance be justifiable,78 and it altogether fails to consider
that the detriment may have been inevitable.
If Suire had attempted to refuse entry, i.e., refused to rely on
the defendant's promise, the damage to Suire's home (the
detriment in question) would still have occurred since the
defendant was entitled to enter the land and perform its work.79
The existence of the servitude gave rise to rights and duties that
mandated the result.80  If the detriment would inevitably have
occurred whether or not Suire relied on the promise, it is incorrect
to say that the detriment occurred "because of the reliance."
81
Though the current judicial test does include language strongly
suggesting that the reliance must actually cause the detriment, the
supreme court's analysis in Suire reveals how little weight, if any,
is given to the consideration of causation. Where the detriment
would have occurred regardless of whether the plaintiff relied on
the defendant's promise, it is incorrect to say that the detriment
was caused by the reliance. Permitting a plaintiff to proceed on the
theory of detrimental reliance when the detriment was inevitable is
illogical and inefficient. Thus, a proper judicial test should not
permit pursuit of a detrimental reliance claim where the detriment
was inevitable.
78. See source cited supra note 18 and accompanying text.
79. See source cited supra note 71 and accompanying text. Again, this note
assumes for the sake of simplicity that the defendant caused the damage. See
sources cited supra note 57 and accompanying text.
80. See source cited supra note 71 and accompanying text.
81. See source cited supra note 73. Alternatively, the problem may be
phrased in terms of the promisee plaintiffs lack of free will in the face of
inevitability. The concept of reliance implies a choice, so the absence of free
will is fatal in the analysis. The problem with using the term "free will" is that it
introduces a subjective connotation. If a promisee was ignorant of the
inevitability of a detriment, then that promisee retained the illusion of free will
and, hence, the illusion of choice in relying on the promise. Objectively,
however, the result was still inevitable, and reliance on the promise was not the
cause of the detriment. Thus, courts should phrase the problem in terms of
inevitability (with its connotations of objectivity), which can be determined with
reference to legal rights and duties, e.g., the law of servitude, rather than to the
subjective belief of the parties.
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IV. ALONG THE PATH TO ENLIGHTENMENT: A NEW JUDICIAL TEST
A proper judicial test should pose the relevant questions from
the current test while asking new questions to properly confront the
problems of alternative theories of recovery and inevitability. The
test should be relatively simple to apply while leaving room for
judicial discretion.
A. Just Five Steps: The New Test
Rather than the current three-part judicial test, as exemplified
in Suire, Louisiana courts should modify the judicial test to more
appropriately handle detrimental reliance claims. In addition to the
current requirements, 82  courts should add two additionalrequirements, resulting in the following test:
The theory of detrimental reliance is available only where:
(1) there was a representation by conduct or word;
(2) there was justifiable reliance on the representation;
(3) there was a change in position to one's detriment
because of the reliance;
(4) no appropriate alternative theory of recovery is
available; and
(5) the detriment was not inevitable.
The modified test, like the current test, requires that all criteria
be met. Should any criterion fail, recovery under the theory of
detrimental reliance should not be permitted. 3
82. See sources cited supra note 18.
83. Not permitting a detrimental reliance claim because an appropriate
alternative theory of recovery is available is another way of saying that the court
will avoid touching the issue of detrimental reliance unless it has no choice.
Refusing to permit a detrimental reliance claim because the detriment was
inevitable leaves open the possibility of other theories of recovery. For
example, the detriment in Suire was potentially inevitable because of the
existence of the servitude; if so, then detrimental reliance is an inappropriate
theory of recovery, but Suire may still recover under property law. See
discussion supra Part III.B.
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B. Applying the Modified Test to Suire
It will help to better explain the proposed test and to apply the
pleaded facts of Suire to it by way of example:
1. Was There a Representation by Conduct or Word?
Suire alleges that the defendant "assured him that they would
be responsible for remedying any damages to his property caused
by the construction." 84  Thus, the pleaded facts include a
representation by word.
2. Was There Justifiable Reliance on the Representation?
This is potentially the most difficult part of the analysis since
the court must determine whether there was reliance and whether
that reliance was justifiable. Reliance alone appears to be
subjective, but the word "justifiable" suggests an objective element
as well. However, the word "justifiable" is elusive since a court
may change the interpretation to reach the desired result. The
supreme court glosses over this element in Suire and suggests that
merely alleging uncompensated damages is enough to show
justifiable reliance. 5 Under any test, this issue warrants more
serious attention.
84. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 42 (La.
2005). Suire recalls one such assurance as: "[W]e're going to take care of you.
We're going to replace everything. Blade for blade, grass for grass, tree for tree
.... If we do anything destructive, we're going to repair it." Brief of Suire to
All Defendants, supra note 8, at 2.
85. Suire, 907 So. 2d at 59. The court compresses the issues of whether
there was reliance, whether it was justifiable, and whether there was a detriment
because of that reliance into a single, oversimplified question:
[T]o establish reliance to his detriment, Suire need only show that he
suffered damages not adequately compensated by the defendant. Here,
it is undisputed that the plaintiff allowed access to his property, and that
the City has not paid to repair the damage to the property, as the
plaintiff alleges that the City promised to do. Thus, the plaintiff has
presented adequate summary judgment proof of this element of his
detrimental reliance claim.
Id. (citation omitted).
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If all other elements of this test are satisfied, it is reasonable to
give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on the justifiability of the
reliance since the theory of detrimental reliance is otherwise
appropriate. Unless the reliance was clearly not justifiable, the
court should allow the plaintiff his or her day in court. If the court
can determine under another criterion of this test that the theory is
inappropriate, however, it need not even address this issue. On the
facts of Suire, a court should have sufficient leeway in the word
"justifiable" to decide this criterion as it sees fit.
3. Was There a Change in Position to One 's Detriment
Because of the Reliance?
The court specifically stated that "it is undisputed that the
plaintiff allowed access to his property, and that the City has not
paid to repair the damage to the property. .. ,6 This means only
that the plaintiff has suffered some detriment, not that the
detriment was caused by reliance on the defendant's promise. The
phrase "because of the reliance" strongly suggests that the reliance
must cause the detriment.87 A court must examine the element of
causation, even at the summary judgment level. If the pleaded
facts make clear that the reliance did not cause the detriment, it is
inappropriate to permit recovery under detrimental reliance.
88
4. Was No Appropriate Alternative Theory of Recovery
Available?
Not only do potential alternative theories of recovery exist, but
Suire actually brought several of them: the case will proceed to
trial under the theories of negligence, trespass, and expropriation.
89
Suire has adequate recovery available under the alternative
86. Id.
87. See source cited supra note 73.
88. For example, consider the following hypothetical: Suire explicitly tells
the city that he is only permitting entry onto his property because he is relying
on its promise to repair any damage caused. In the next instant, a meteor falls to
earth, completely destroying Suire's home. Based on the pleaded facts alone, a
court should properly find that the reliance did not cause the detriment.
Additionally, see the analysis of inevitability infra Part IV.B.5.
89. See sources cited supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
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theories, particularly negligence. 90 Furthermore, the detrimental
reliance claim arguably will be more difficult to prove since it
requires proof of the underlying promise in addition to proof of
causation. 91 Because appropriate alternative theories of recovery
were available, this criterion fails, and permitting this case to
proceed under detrimental reliance theory is inappropriate.
5. Was the Detriment Inevitable?
If, as it appears, the defendant had a legal servitude on Suire's
property, then the detriment was inevitable. 92 Whether Suire relied
on the defendant's alleged promise or not, the damage was bound
to occur.93 Where the detriment was inevitable, this fifth criterion
fails, and the plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed under the
doctrine of detrimental reliance.
C. Summary of the Analysis
Under the proposed modified judicial test, Suire should not be
permitted to proceed under the theory of detrimental reliance
because appropriate alternative theories of recovery are available
and because the detriment appears to have been inevitable.
Because either of these is sufficient reason not to permit use of the
theory, no other criterion need be determined. However, even if
both of those criteria were satisfied, the court must still determine
whether the reliance was justifiable and whether the reliance
caused the detriment, which are potentially complicated questions.
Ultimately, the court should not have permitted Suire to proceed
under the theory of detrimental reliance.
90. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of general tort theory, which of
course encompasses negligence.
91. See sources cited supra note 57 and accompanying text.
92. See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C.
93. Id.
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V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S CURRENT
TREATMENT
The Louisiana Supreme Court permitted Suire to proceed under
the theory of detrimental reliance without fully explaining what it
was doing.94 Permitting the theory was inappropriate for a number
of reasons. Most obviously, the trial will now involve more
issues, 95 but Suire's recovery will still be limited to the amount of
his damages. 96 Suire's trial will be less efficient without bringing a
corresponding benefit to him. Thus, in permitting the detrimental
reliance theory to proceed to trial in Suire, the supreme court
pushes the theory beyond its appropriate bounds while doing little
to help the plaintiff.
The court improperly permits the claim for two reasons. First,
the court does not consider that the detriment in question may have
been inevitable as a matter of law, so the court's decision
essentially removes the causation requirement from the analysis.
97
Second, the court permits a detrimental reliance claim where an
alternative theory of recovery is appropriate. 98 In doing so, the
court needlessly meddles with the theory and applies it liberally
where Louisiana courts have traditionally applied it sparingly. 99
The liberal application of the theory conflicts with its statutory
basis. The 1984 Code revisions codified the theory within the
article on cause under Title IV of the Civil Code, which pertains to
94. See Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 52-60
(La. 2005). See also source cited supra note 85 and accompanying text.
95. See sources cited supra note 57 and accompanying text.
96. "Compensatory damages are designed to place the plaintiff in the
position in which he would have been if the tort had not been committed."
Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., LOUIsIANA TORT LAW § 7.01 (2d
ed. 2004). Thus, if Suire recovers compensatory damages under any of his
alternative theories and is made whole, he cannot be made any more whole by
adding a detrimental reliance claim.
97. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B.5.
98. See discussion supra Parts II.C, III.
99. See, e.g., Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Antonini, 862 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 2003). "Detrimental reliance is not favored in our law and is sparingly
applied as it bars the normal assertion of rights otherwise present." Id. at 336
(citing Miller v. Miller, 817 So. 2d 1166 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 827 So.
2d 1154 (La. 2002)).
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conventional obligations or contracts. 00  By doing so, the
legislature suggested that detrimental reliance under Louisiana law
is strongly related to contracts, yet its precise relationship to
contract law remains unclear.' 10  Nevertheless, it appears that
detrimental reliance is supposed to be the basis for enforcing an
obligation that is not otherwise enforceable.' 02 Where, as here, the
obligation is otherwise enforceable,' 0 3 the court should not permit
the detrimental reliance claim to continue; doing so represents an
overextension of the theory of detrimental reliance.
The major problem for the future is that detrimental reliance
now appears to have no bounds. If the theory of detrimental
reliance is now available even when the obligation in question was
already enforceable under another legal theory, then how will the
court limit the theory in future cases? If the theory is not merely
an alternative ground for enforcing an obligation, can it now be
used where a valid contract already exists? To do so would
weaken contract law since it might enable use of the theory of
detrimental reliance to escape express contractual terms.
10 4
However, it is difficult to see how the theory of detrimental
100. See generally Snyder, supra note 22. See also LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
1967 (2006).
101. "[I]t is not consistent to state promissory estoppel in a code article that
deals with cause, because promissory estoppel is not an acceptable substitute for
cause . . . . [I]n contrast to consideration, cause does not need a substitute."
Larroumet, supra note 27, at 1225. "Article 1967 does not reveal whether
detrimental reliance is a new element of contracts, a substitute for cause, or a
source of contractual obligations." Adcock, supra note 25, at 760.
102. "Under this article, a promise becomes an enforceable obligation when
it is made in a manner that induces the other party to rely on it to his detriment."
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 cmt. (d) (2006) (emphasis added).
103. Because the obligation is to repair damages, it is the same obligation at
the heart of Suire's negligence claim. See discussion supra Part II.A.
104. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 22, at 743-47. Louisiana has so far
declined to allow the use of detrimental reliance where an express contractual
term applies. Id. at 746 (citing Edwards v. Conforto, 636 So. 2d 901, 907 (La.
1994)). In Edwards v. Conforto, the court held that because the plaintiff had a
contractual obligation to repair the damage at its own expense, doing so could
not have been caused by reliance on a later promise made by the defendant's
lawyer. 636 So. 2d 901, 907 (La. 1994). This analysis represents a proper
application of what this note more generally terms "inevitability." See
discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B.5.
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reliance would be restricted after Suire since the court permits it to
be a primary basis for recovery where an appropriate alternative
theory exists. Furthermore, the court says that "proof of a
detrimental reliance claim does not require proof of an underlying
contract,"' 0 5 which suggests that a detrimental reliance claim might
be pursued even with proof of an underlying contract.' 0 6 There is
simply no way to predict the future of detrimental reliance theory
in Louisiana. It is safe to say, however, that Suire muddies the
already murky waters of the theory.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Suire overextended the theory of detrimental
reliance because it failed to properly apply the current judicial test
to the legal theory of detrimental reliance. Though the old
common law "theory of the case" is obviously not in force in
Louisiana,'0 7 legal theories are still necessary and useful.
Obviously, a plaintiff must know which facts to plead in order to
recover, and it is efficient for courts to focus their analysis only on
material facts rather than looking at every fact in each case. Thus,
even under modern pleading rules, the use of legal theories is alive
and well. 10 8 The current judicial test requires a plaintiff to satisfy
three elements in order to bring a claim for detrimental reliance, 10 9
but embedded in the simple language of the test are two implied
criteria that the court does not examine. 110 By failing to properly
apply the test, the supreme court muddied the already murky
waters surrounding the theory of detrimental reliance.
105. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So. 2d 37, 59 (La.
2005).
106. Suire thus seems to approve of the relatively small number of previous
Louisiana decisions that already either gave equal weight to contract and
detrimental reliance theories, or disregarded a valid contract in favor of
detrimental reliance analysis. See Snyder, supra note 22, at 743-47.
107. See sources cited supra note 53 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 136, 139 (La. 2005), in
which the supreme court refers to the three elements of a malpractice claim and
the four elements of a defamation claim.
109. See source cited supra note 18 and accompanying text.
110. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B.2, IV.B.3.
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The long-term ramifications of the court's decision are
unclear,"' but Louisiana courts can easily avoid any unnecessary
consequences by simply applying a proper test for detrimental
reliance claims. Though the current judicial test at least implies the
proper criteria," 2 Louisiana courts, as exemplified by Suire, may
fail to apply it correctly. Thus, Louisiana courts should adopt a
judicial test that makes explicit what is already implicit with
respect to appropriate alternative theories of recovery and
inevitable detriment. 113  The following is a proposed modified
judicial test:
The theory of detrimental reliance is available only where:
(1) there was a representation by conduct or word;
(2) there was justifiable reliance on the representation;
(3) there was a change in position to one's detriment
because of the reliance;
(4) no appropriate alternative theory of recovery is
available; and
(5) the detriment was not inevitable.
Mark Twain once said that "the difference between the almost
right word and the right word is really a large matter-'tis the
difference between the lightning-bug and the lightning."' 1 4  By
making explicit two criteria that are currently implicit and easily
overlooked, Louisiana courts can improve the judicial test for the
elements of a detrimental reliance claim. With but a small change,
the courts can avoid overextending the theory of detrimental
reliance. With but a small change, Louisiana courts can turn
lightning back into a lightning bug.
Stuart T. Welch*
111. See discussion supra Part V.
112. See source cited supra notes 109-110.
113. See discussion supra Parts II.C, III.C.
114, Twain, supra note 1, at 360.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Frank L. Maraist for his guidance
and help.
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